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I. Introduction and the importance of the research 
 
In the last 150 years, the energy industry went through 
significant transformations and these changes did not avoid 
the petroleum industry, either. In the 1970s, the oil sectors of 
the Middle Eastern countries were nationalized through which 
the big international oil companies (IOCs) lost their rights to 
possess and produce the oil reserves and this right was taken 
over by the national oil companies (NOCs). Through the 
nationalization, national oil companies with huge oil reserves 
were formed. These companies can be found in the countries 
of the Middle East, in Venezuela and several other countries 
where significant oil reserves can be found. In most of the 
cases, these new NOCs did not offer access to their reserves 
the international oil companies. As a result, the replacement of 
the produced oil and gas became the main task of international 
oil companies. 
Keeping this in mind, an outsider could divide the oil 
companies into two different groups: first, international oil 
companies seeking oil reserves and having the capability to 
produce them and, second, national oil companies having 
access to a significant amount of petroleum resources. Based 
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on this, the cooperation between the two groups seemed 
logical: NOCs are going to offer petroleum reserves the 
international oil companies in exchange of the technology to 
produce them. However, the petroleum industry was 
significantly affected by several developments at the 
beginning of the 2000s. New national oil companies seeking 
petroleum reserves emerged quickly and became competitors 
of the international oil companies.  
Based on this, many (Abdeal (2008) or Oliveira-Stark-
Lawrie (2006)), imply that in the future NOCs will not need 
the capabilities of IOCs as they will be replaced by the 
services of the newly emerging NOCs. However, there are 
others (Ledesma (2009) or Isobel Rea (2008)) who do not 
share this view. It is striking that none of the papers carry out 
analyses on a company level. 
Based on the corporate experiences, therefore, the author 
of this dissertation would like to answer the question, how the 
relationship between NOCs and IOCs and between NOCs 
themselves developed. Through this, we would like to get to 
know whether the strengthening of the NOC-NOC 
relationships can be observed and if so, then whether it raises 
6 
 
the question that the position of the international oil 
companies in the future deteriorates.  
Unlike others having a view from above, the macro level, 
the author of this dissertation seeks to conduct this research by 
analyzing the forms and existence of the cooperation among 
the companies, themselves, on a micro level.  
In our research we analyze the relations of four national 
oil companies between 2000 and 2010. These companies are 
as follows: 
1) Saudi Aramco 
2) National Iranian Oil Company 
3) Petróleos de Venezuela SA 
4) Petrobras. 
 
We chose them for the reasons below. 
 
 Saudi Aramco is the most significant oil company in the 
world. Based on its production, it is the biggest oil company 
globally, based on its reserves, starting from 2010 it is the 
second biggest behind Venezuela. It has access to roughly one 
fifth of the global oil reserves. It has an oil production 
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capacity of 12 Mbpd1, this accounts for 13-14% of the 
production capacity worldwide. The company’s single owner 
is the Saudi state.  
The National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC is fully owned 
by the Iranian state. It has access to 10% of the global oil 
reserves and to 16% of the global gas reserves. In 2010 it 
produced roughly 3,5 million barrels of oil per day2.  
Petróleos de Venezuela, PDVSA is the national oil 
company of Venezuela. Based on its proved reserves, it took 
over the first place from Saudi Arabia in 2010. Recently, its 
reserves were increased by heavy and extra heavy oil, between 
2006 and 2010 its total reserves were more than tripled. The 
cooperation of PDVSA is interesting not only for this reason 
but because the production of its reserves requires special 
technology.  
We drew the Brazilian national oil company, Petrobras 
into our analysis because it is a national oil company serving 
as a model for several other NOCs. Another reason for having 
chosen it is that the company is a specialist in the field of 
deep-water oil and gas exploration and production. In the 
future, these capabilities might become a major competitive 
                                                          
1
 Million barrels per day. 
2
 OPEC (2011): OPEC Annual Statitical Bulletin 2010-11, Vienna. 
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advantage for the firm as recent new oil provinces are located 
in the deep waters of seas and oceans. Such highly promising 
provinces have been found in Western Africa (starting from 
Nigeria as far as the shores of Sierra Leone), the offshore 
areas of Brasilia, the South-China Sea, the deep-waters of 
Australia and the Alaskan waters might prove to be prolific 
areas, too. This might raise the value of the deep-water 
capabilities and technology of Petrobras. 
In 2010, the four companies chosen had free access to the 
half of global oil reserves and extracted roughly 20% of the oil 
produced globally3. 
 
In our dissertation we analyze the upstream and 
downstream sectors separately. Our hypotheses are as follows: 
 
1. hypothesis: during our research period, in the upstream 
cooperation system of the analyzed national oil 
companies the role of the cooperation with national oil 
companies increased. 
 
                                                          
3
 OPEC (2011): OPEC Annual Statitical Bulletin 2010-11, Vienna. 
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2. hypothesis: during our research period, in the 
downstream cooperation system of the analyzed national 
oil companies the role of the cooperation with national oil 
companies increased. 
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II. Methodology 
 
In our research we strived to underpin our arguments by 
using quantitative methods. However, it was clear already at 
the beginning of the research that it will not be feasible and we 
were convinced that it would not be sufficient, either.  
 
There are several hurdles to use quantitative methods:  
1) The subjects of our analysis are national oil 
companies. Several of them are the national oil 
companies of countries where not democracy is the 
main source of power and their data are not public.  
2) The other hurdle is that oil industry data are 
generally a secret. The exact size of oil reserves or the 
depletion rates of different fields for instance are in 
several cases not published. 
3) Third, even if national oil companies publish their 
annual reports (PDVSA has not done so for years 
already), they often paint an overly optimistic future for 
themselves and present themselves in an overly positive 
way. It is especially true for national companies which 
are “national champions” and based on which the 
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people of the country assess the performance of the 
county’s leadership. 
 
The use of quantitative methods would not be sufficient 
because trough them, we would not be able to reveal the true 
picture of the cooperation of the relevant oil companies. It 
might namely happen that between 2000 and 2005 a company 
carries out its activities on its own and starts to have common 
exploration projects with other oil companies in 2006. As 
these exploration efforts do not result in petroleum production 
until 2010, our quantitative data would not show any upstream 
cooperation of the company which would be misleading.  
  
Because of this (namely the lack of full data coverage and 
the insufficiency described above), we do not make any 
conclusions based solely on the available quantitative data. 
Besides these data, we always look into the ambitions and 
goals of the company, first of all into the performance 
achieved, the planned and realized projects, as well. As you 
will see, there is often a huge gap between the projects 
planned or communicated and realized. 
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In our research, we do not only reveal projects realized 
but those too which the company strived to realize but for a 
reason these efforts turned out to be superfluous. From these 
efforts and goals we can conclude what the company needs, 
what are the services it seeks to get from other companies. It 
means we can reveal the motivation behind its willingness to 
cooperate.  
One of the major elements of our methodology is that we 
put the activities and the cooperation system of the companies 
together by using mainly news resources of the petroleum 
industry. We create this picture as a puzzle. The news found 
are categorized and they represent the data of our research. We 
intend to use academic publications only for control reasons. 
We do so as we do not want to lean on sources containing a 
selected set of operations of our analyzed companies. 
Using news materials for the relevant years (2000-2010) 
offers the advantage of being able to find information 
currently not available in libraries or on the internet. Such 
pieces of information are e.g. the annual reports of the 
corporations from the early 2000s, the comments of the 
managers, press reports but they might include the numerical 
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data of several common projects planned or realized that time 
(e.g. initial production data of oil fields). 
If the national oil company subject to our analysis 
realized many common projects or only some but for the 
analyzed NOC significant ones with other national oil 
companies or it made significant efforts to realize such 
projects, we accept our hypotheses. 
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III. Results of the thesis 
 
Our results from the research on the upstream 
cooperation are as follows: 
1) The National Iranian Oil Company had good a 
relationship to international oil companies in 2000. From 
2005 on this has changed. By the end of our research 
period the company clearly had turned to national oil 
companies.  
2) The cooperation of the Saudi Aramco with foreign oil 
companies was negligible at the beginning and at the 
end of our research period, too. The company did not 
have extensive cooperation with IOCs or NOCs, either. 
3) In 2000, Petróleos de Venezuela had fruitful upstream 
oil relationships to several international oil companies. 
By 2010 it had changed completely. By that time, its 
new partners were national oil companies. In its gas 
relationships, there was only a minor change: in the 
biggest part of the research period it was the IOCs which 
got exploration and production rights, but at the end of 
the 2000-2010 period, national oil companies had such 
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rights, too. However, no significant cooperation had 
developed.  
4) During our research period, the cooperation of Petrobras 
with foreign oil companies resulted in very minor 
common projects if at all. The Brazilian company 
enjoyed good relationship to the international oil 
companies, however, the production of the common 
projects was not significant. The company carried out 
common projects abroad with international and national 
oil companies, too, but their significance was low. 
 
Based on these results, we accept our first hypothesis. In 
the upstream cooperation system of two of the analyzed four 
companies the role of the cooperation with national oil 
companies increased. In case of the other two companies the 
role of the cooperation with NOCs did not change. 
 
Our results from the research on the downstream 
cooperation are as follows: 
  
1) At the beginning of the research period the National 
Iranian Oil Company had only negotiations with 
16 
 
international oil companies about common downstream 
projects. By the end of the 2000-2010 period, NIOC had 
turned to national oil companies. However, the results of 
the cooperation with NOCs remained moderate. 
2) At the beginning and at the end of the 2000-2010 period, 
it were the international oil companies which were the 
downstream partners of Saudi Aramco. In fact, their role 
(IOCs) had slightly increased by 2010. A new refinery in 
China built with a Chinese NOC does not change the 
dominance of IOCs in the downstream cooperation of 
Saudi Aramco.  
3) In its downstream cooperation, the Petróleos de 
Venezuela clearly turned to the national oil companies. 
However, the fruits of this cooperation remained 
insignificant, they are mostly formulated in plans only. 
4) The downstream cooperation of Petrobras was negligible 
at the beginning and at the end of the research period, 
too. Between 2000 and 2010, the Brazilian company 
bought a few downstream assets, in which its partners 
were international oil companies.  
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Based on these results, we accept our second hypothesis. 
In case of two of the analyzed four companies (Saudi Aramco 
and Petrobras), the role of the national or international oil 
companies in the downstream cooperation system hardly 
changed. In the downstream cooperation system of the 
National Iranian Oil Company and the Petróleos de 
Venezuela, the national oil companies gained round. However, 
the results of their cooperation with the NOCs remained low. 
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IV. Conclusions 
 
The main question of our research was whether the 
emerging NOCs displace the IOCs from their role as a partner 
of NOCs. In this question the literature was divided. We 
answered this question by conducting research on the 
relationships of national oil companies. As a result of our 
research, about this, the following can be said. 
  
Our micro-level research has shown that the group of 
NOCs is divided. There are national oil companies (like 
PDVSA and NIOC) which in the research period turned from 
the international oil companies to the national ones and sought 
to substitute for the services of the previous ones with those of 
the latter ones. This was observed both in the upstream and 
downstream sectors. However, it can be shown, too that until 
2010 the results of this cooperation were not significant (this 
might be subject to change later!). Neither the NIOC, nor the 
PDVSA built a refinery in cooperation with any national oil 
company, nor did the upstream cooperation resulted in 
projects measurable in oil or gas production. 
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The other two companies analyzed (Saudi Aramco and 
Petrobras) did not strive for the substitution of the 
international oil companies. 
 
From this, two conclusions could be drawn. 
First, the group of national oil companies is not 
homogenous. The level of analysis of the relationship between 
NOCs and IOCs or NOCs and NOCs is therefore mistaken. 
The right level of analysis is one level lower: the analyses 
should be carried out on the level of the companies themselves 
and not on the level of the groups (NOC/IOC). Further, it is 
important to note that the group of NOCs can be divided into 
two more subgroups: one is made up of NOCs from emerging 
countries (China and India for instance) looking for resources, 
the second consists of the national oil companies of the oil 
exporting countries. Even more can be said: these subgroups 
are not homogenous, either. Although Saudi Aramco and 
PDVSA belong to the same subgroup (NOCs of oil exporting 
countries), you cannot say they are similar in their 
relationships to other NOCs, their efforts to shape them or 
their goals to create them. 
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Our second conclusion is that national oil companies 
(NOCs) generally cannot substitute for the operations of the 
international oil companies (IOCs) as a whole, therefore it can 
be said that NOCs do not pose a threat to the existence of 
IOCs (at least for the moment). This, of course, does not mean 
that there aren’t any fields where the NOCs are not highly 
competitive with the international oil companies. Such fields 
are for instance the biddings for oil and gas production rights, 
the use of conventional technologies and the development of 
less complex projects. Moreover, there a few NOCs that excel 
in some fields. Petrobras excels in its deep-water technology, 
Petronas and Sonatrach have become strong competitors with 
their substantial experience in the LNG sector.  
International oil companies can secure their existence 
through their excellence in capabilities NOCs do not possess. 
Such capabilities are first of all the use of certain technologies 
(EOR, production of non-conventional resources) and their 
experience in the downstream sector. For the IOCs, therefore 
the keeping of the downstream division is important for the 
reason as this can be the center of the future NOC-IOC 
relationship.  
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From the acceptance of our hypotheses we can conclude 
a third finding, namely that in general the cooperation among 
the national oil companies increases (in some cases they are 
strengthening, in others they do not change). The result of this 
is that in the global petroleum industry there are more and 
more products which are the results of cooperation among 
parties that do not always make their decisions based on 
profitability. As NOCs have good relationships to their 
governments and as these governments do have impact on 
their NOCs, the state influence in the petroleum industry is 
increasing.  
And the fact that there are companies emerging in the 
petroleum industry managing their operations based not solely 
on profitability, has to impact the strategies of the 
international oil companies. The IOCs should become aware 
of this and they should adapt their strategy accordingly.  
Further, the governments of the IOCs (if identifiable) 
have to become aware of this, too. The fact that the role of 
intergovernmental relations in the global petroleum industry is 
increasing means that a company having governmental 
support through the right development of foreign policy can be 
more successful on the petroleum market.  
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The strengthening of the intergovernmental relations, as a 
factor of competitiveness should be an incentive for the 
foreign and energy policymakers to not only keep the interests 
of the domestic oil company in mind but to actively represent 
and support it, as well.  
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